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ABSTRACT 
Recent research suggests that our understanding of the abstract domain of time is 
dependent on the more concrete domain of space. At once time is measurable and 
abstract, thus we often think of it both temporally as well as spatially. Boroditsky and 
Ramscar (2002) find that the spatial domain influences whether people see themselves as 
moving through time (ego-moving perspective) or as time moving towards them (time-
moving perspective). Might there be other factors at work influencing these perspectives 
other than just representations of spatial experience? 
The current studies investigate the role that emotion plays in construal of time. 
Specifically, do people's feelings about an event influence how they perceive time and do 
people's perception of time influence how they feel about an event? Consistent with ego-
moving and time-moving perspectives, results suggest a significant effect of emotion on 
time construal such that people who have negative feelings about an event report that 
event as approaching them while people who have positive feelings about an event see 
themselves as approaching that event. A follow-up study shows the reverse process to be 
true such that ego-moving and time-moving language influence subjective positivity and 
negativity, respectively. 
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Ill 
Imagine you have an event scheduled next Wednesday. Now imagine that you 
have been told that the event has been moved forward two days. To which day is it now 
rescheduled? If you answered Monday, you are correct. However, if you answered 
Friday, you are correct too. It all depends on how you conceptualize the word "forward". 
Recent research suggests that such ambiguity stems from our use of space to 
conceptualize time. At once, time is measurable and abstract and thus we often think of it 
both temporally as well as in the more concrete experience domain of space (Boroditsky, 
2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). As a result, our language reflects this dependency. 
Further, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) find that this spatial domain influences how 
people perceive time. Whether people see themselves as moving through time (ego-
moving perspective) or as time moving towards them (time-moving perspective) depends 
on their spatial context. Thus it is from these two perspectives that people conceptualize 
time. Might there be other factors at work influencing these perspectives other than just 
representations of spatial experience? 
A growing body of research emphasizes the fundamental role that emotion plays 
in cognitive processing and sensorimotor experiences (Cacioppo, Priester, & Bernston, 
1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Damasio, 1994). Therefore it would seem plausible that 
emotion would inherently have a significant effect on time construal. For instance, might 
there be differences between how people think about the timing of an event about which 
they feel enthusiasm or dread? In our language we think of negative events as hanging 
heavily over our bent heads whereas we look forward to and up to positive events. Might 
such metaphors be indicative of how feeling might effect time perception? By examining 
the possible effects of emotion on conceptualization of time, this study seeks to extend 
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the current research and develop a more encompassing picture of how people 
conceptualize time. 
The past couple of decades have witnessed a surge of research in cognition as it is 
related to sensorimotor experiences and emotional processing (Cacioppo et al., 1993;. 
Chen & Bargh, 1999). Straying from the dualist Cartesian idea of mind and body as 
separate entities, many researchers have found evidence for a non-dualist existence such 
that the mind and body interact in intricate and inseparable ways. For these scientists, the 
assumed dichotomy of perception and conception is inaccurate. Conversely, the two are 
seen as collapsed and as part of the same bidirectional process (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
Our interactions with the world inform and are informed by cognitive processes and thus, 
the theory suggests, the mind cannot be thought of as a disembodied entity. Barsalou 
(2003) claims that knowledge is based on our perceptual experience in the world and is 
derived from "partial simulations of sensory, motor and introspective states" (p. 44). 
Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that this knowledge, the concepts that 
we have about the world, are not merely reflections of a disembodied reality but are 
formed by our unique sensorimotor experiences and that together our "bodies, brains and 
interactions with our environment provide the most conscious basis for our everyday 
metaphysics, that is, ou~ sense of what is real" (p.16). 
It is from this "embodied realism" that conceptual metaphors arise. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) argue that we learn to represent abstract concepts by relating them to 
more concrete ones. In other words, sensorimotor experiences can be applied to domains 
of subjective experiences in order to help us conceptualize these otherwise abstract and 
intangible concepts (Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995: Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 
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1999). An example of this is emotion and space. Emotions are abstract concepts that we 
understand via our experiences in spatial domains. For instance, we think of happy as up 
and sad as down. From such associations we come to think of emotion in spatial terms. 
Thus conceptual metaphor becomes a mechanism with which assumptions derived from a 
more concrete experiential domain are applied to a more abstract concept. Boroditsky and 
Ramscar (2002) expand on this idea and claim that not only is abstract knowledge built 
on experiences in a more concrete domain, but that these experiences can simultaneously 
change and shape such abstract knowledge. 
The present research focuses on the conceptual metaphor of space as it relates to 
time. Our language is infused with spatial terms that are used to describe and understand 
temporal concepts. While time can be conceived of in temporal terms (i.e., early and late) 
these are limited and thus we enrich our concept of time by understanding it in terms of 
spatial domains as well (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980,1999; Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky 
& Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, Imai & Boroditsky, 2002; McGione & Harding, 1998; 
Nunez, 1999). Because time is conventionally thought of as one-dimensional, only those 
spatial terms that reflect one dimension are found in temporal language. For example, 
ahead/behind and forward/back work, whereas deep/shallow do not (McGlone & 
Harding, 1998; Gentner. 2001). 
Boroditsky (2000) argues that these one-dimensional spatial metaphors provide 
structure to abstract concepts of time and that such structure may come to be encoded in 
one's conceptual domain of time, even when using temporal language. In a series of 
experiments, Boroditsky (2001) examined whether the differences in how English and 
Mandarin speakers talk about time, horizontally and vertically respectively, would reflect 
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the way the speakers think about time. After having participants (English and Mandarin 
speakers) solve horizontal or vertical spatial primes, she measured reaction time for 
answering true or false to the following temporal statement: "March comes earlier than 
April". As predicted, Mandarin speakers were quicker to answer true after vertical primes 
than after horizontal primes. The reverse was true for English speakers. Such results 
provide support for the idea that spatiotemporal metaphors not only provide a convenient 
tool for conceptualizing time but they also affect how time is conceptualized. 
Even so, such metaphoric structures must be understood with respect to 
perspective of time (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gentner, 2001; 
Gentner et al., 2002; McGlone & Harding, 1998). Specifically, research has shown that 
our language taps into two spatiotemporal metaphoric systems: the ego-moving metaphor 
where the observer progresses through space and time toward the future and the time-
moving metaphor where time is construed as passing by the observer, like a "conveyor 
belt or river", and events move from the future to the past. For instance, one might say 
"we passed the deadline" (ego-moving) or "the deadline passed" (time moving). While 
both sentences share the same meaning, they differ in perspective. 
What does this say, however, about how we think? Could it be the case that these 
metaphoric differences are merely linguistic choices and not conceptually based? Current 
findings would suggest not. Several recent studies have examined this question by 
looking at the metaphor consistency effect with respect to the two space-time metaphors 
(Gentner et al., 2002; Langston, 2002). Specifically, according to the metaphor 
consistency effect, a "boggle" reaction occurs when one reads mixed metaphors and 
consequently this reaction interferes with comprehension time (Gentner, 2001). Based on 
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this idea, it would stand to reason that mixing the two spatiotemporal metaphors might 
have the same effect. 
Gentner et. al. (2002) applied this reasoning to a reaction-time comprehension 
task. Participants were given three setting sentences followed by a test sentence 
describing a temporal relation between two events. In the consistent mapping condition, 
the setting sentences and the test sentence used the same metaphoric perspective (ego 
moving or time-moving) while in the inconsistent mapping condition the setting 
sentences used a different mapping system than that of the test sentence. As predicted, 
participants in the consistent condition responded significantly faster than those in the 
inconsistent condition. As a means of ensuring that their findings were not a product of 
similar words in the consistent condition, the researchers conducted a second study 
(Genter et al., 2002) using the same methods as the first experiment. This time however, 
they used words that can be used in both the ego-moving and the time-moving 
metaphors, such as ahead, before and behind. Again, they found that participants were 
quicker to react in the consistent condition than in the inconsistent condition. Similarly, 
Langston (2002) found that participants had slower reading times for texts that violate 
orientational metaphors than those that are consistent. Throughout all of these studies, it 
was found that metaphoric inconsistency interfered with comprehension. 
McGlone and Harding (1998) provide further support for such findings by 
examining the role that these two perspectives play in temporal language comprehension 
in a slightly different manner. After being primed in either the ego-moving or time-
moving perspective by using context sentences, participants saw a target sentence 
describing a scenario in which a fictitious event originally scheduled to take place on one 
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day had been rescheduled. The rescheduling was described in one of three ways: 
advanced, moved forward, or moved back. The participants were then asked to indicate to 
which day the event had been rescheduled, given the choice of Monday or Friday. They 
found that priming did have an effect on time construal such that those primed in the ~go­
moving condition tended to say Friday while those in the time-moving condition tended 
to say Monday. It should be noted, however, that these results were stronger when the 
question posed used "advanced" and "moved forward" as opposed to "moved back". 
Gentner et al. (2002) proceeded to test the generalizability of these phenomena to 
the real world, O'Hare Airport. Participants were approached and greeted with the 
introductory statement "Hello, I'm on my way to Boston." After which they were asked 
either "Is Boston ahead or behind us time-wise?" (ego-moving question) or "Is it later or 
earlier in Boston than it is here?" (time-moving perspective). After the participant 
answered, the experimenter asked the ego-moving test question "Should I turn my watch 
forward or back?" Results indicate that participants in the consistent condition responded 
faster than those in the inconsistent condition. Moreover, participants in the inconsistent 
condition often, switched back to the original primed condition. 
Expanding on these findings, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) found that not only 
does spatial metaphor influence conceptualization of time but that representation of space 
as well as representation of movement in particular spatial activities will directly 
influence how people think about time. In a series of experiments participants (who were 
recruited in a lunch line, on a train, and at the airport) were given a one-page 
questionnaire stating: "Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days. 
What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?" Participants who were just 
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getting on or off the train, at the end of a lunch line or had just flown in were si~nificantly 
more likely to say Friday. Conversely, participants who were in the middle of a train ride, 
at the beginning of a lunch line or who were waiting to depart on a flight were 
significantly more like to say Monday. The researchers reason that the different responses 
stem from participants' perception of their spatial experience, as either ego-moving or 
time-moving. Furthermore, the researchers underscore that it is this thinking, and not the 
actual spatial motion, that influences people's thinking about time. 
The above experiments have either primed or tapped into people's actual 
spatiotemporal perspective as a means of examining if they respond in a metaphoric 
congruent manner to scenarios and questions about time. The evidP.nc.e strongly suggests 
that they do. Might there be other types of priming that would predict similar metaphoric 
congruency? Given recent findings (Damasio, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1993; Chen & 
Bargh, 1999), we suggest that emotional states will tap into these same metaphoric 
structures, such that positivity will prime one spatiotemporal metaphor while negativity 
will prime another. 
Based on his examinations of patients with neurological damage, Damasio (1994) 
claims that emotion is at the foundation of reasoning and thought. Moreover he suggests 
that emotions are derived from body experiences, which consequently influence and drive 
cognitive processes. Further research bolsters this claim by showing how approach and 
avoidance behaviors are mediated by emotional evaluation and not solely by conscious 
thought. Cacioppo et al. (1993) found that motor processes (arm flexion and extension) 
and/or their sensory consequences play a fundamental role in affective evaluation. In 
particular, participants who pushed against a table while viewing neutral stimuli indicated 
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they like the stimuli less than individuals who viewed the same neutral stimuli while 
pulling up against the table. Building upon this research, Friedman and Forster (2000) 
reported that armflexion, relative to arm extension, facilitated insight-related cognitive 
processes while arm extension, relative to arm flexion, facilitated analytic reasoning. 
Chen and Bargh (1999) found the reverse process to be true such that positive 
evaluations produce approach tendencies and negative evaluations produce avoidance 
tendencies. Their findings support the idea that the process of automatic evaluation has 
behavioral as well as motivational consequences and that this relationship is non-
conscious. Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bernston (1999) conclude that such a motivational 
system encourages "free and swift approach to appetitive stimuli and rapid and unfettered 
withdrawal from aversive stimuli" (p.841). Taken together, these studies support the idea 
that emotion activates and is activated by sensorimotor behaviors, such that negative 
affect is associated with withdrawal and positivity is associated with approach toward a 
stimulus. 
Given this conclusion, what would happen to one's construal of time if the 
affective context was experimentally manipulated'? We predict that given such evidence 
of emotion driving approach and avoidance behavior, there would be a similar influence 
on time construal. Specifically, positivity should be associated with the ego-moving 
metaphor (approach) and negativity associated with the time-moving metaphor 
(avoidance). As mentioned earlier, common metaphors found in our language would 
suggest that valenced states would predict such directions. For example we look forward 
to positive events about which we are enthusiastic and we crouch beneath the looming 
negative ones. Might these be considered conceptual metaphors are they merely a non-
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conceptual part of our language? The current studies address this question and these 
predictions. 
Specifically, this research seeks to determine the role of emotion in people's 
spatial thinking about time. In Experiments 1 and 2 we examine whether spatiotemporal 
metaphoric perspectives (ego-moving or time-moving) are influenced by emotion 
(positivity or negativity). We follow up these studies with Experiment 3 which seeks to 
determine whether the ego-moving or time-moving perspectives influence subjective 
positivity or negativity. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 examines whether emotion (dread or enthusiasm) influences one's 
perception of time such that dread activates the time-moving metaphor while enthusiasm 
activates the ego-moving metaphor. 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred and fifty seven University of Richmond 
undergraduates participated in the study. Participants were approached during various 
classes and asked to take 5 minutes of their time to participate in the study on a volunteer 
basis. No credit was given. 
Procedure. The.purpose of the experiment was to examine how valenced events 
influence subjects' construal of time. This was a between subjects study where half of the 
participants were in the positive event group while the other half were in the negative 
event group. 
Participants were given a questionnaire asking them to think of a possible event in 
the future, either real or imaginary, about which they might feel either dread or 
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enthusiasm, depending on their assigned group. Dreadful events, it was suggested, might 
be a stressful exam, a court appearance, defense before an honor council, or removal of 
wisdom teeth. Examples of enthusiastic events may be seeing a distant loved one, ring-
dance, or getting a new car. Additionally, participants were told that they will never be 
asked to share the events they chose to imagine and therefore they should feel free to 
think of any event the prospect of which evokes strong positive or negative feelings. 
They were also told that their event was scheduled for next Wednesday. 
Participants were given one minute to think about their event. After one minute, 
they turned to the next page of the questionnaire on which they were informed that next 
Wednesday's event had been moved forward two days. Following this news, participants 
answered the following questions: 
1. What day is the event now that it has been rescheduled? 
2. How does this news change how you feel about the event? 
Worse 
Better 
3. Which statement best expresses how you feel? 
a. I am approaching this event. 
b. The ~vent is approaching me. 
Results. Three chi-square tests were conducted to assess whether emotion 
influences people's construal of time. The first chi-square looked at how emotional 
condition influences people's response to the question asking to what day the event had 
been rescheduled. The results of this test were not significant, _2 (1, 150) = 2.23, p = .14. 
Time and Emotion 11 
The second chi-square test examined whether participants, depending on condition, 
thought of themselves as approaching the event or the event approaching them. The 
results of this test were significant, _2 (1, 154) = 9.8,p < .01, such that participants in the 
dread condition perceived the event as approaching them, while participants in the 
enthusiastic condition perceived themselves as approaching the event. The third chi-
square test analyzed how participants, for each condition, felt about the event once it had 
been changed. The results of the test were significant, _2 (1, 154) = 11.97, p < .001 
suggesting that participants in the dread condition felt worse about the event once it had 
been changed and those in the enthusiastic condition felt better about the event. The 
observed frequencies for all three questions can be found in Tables IA-1 C. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
This experiment sought to improve upon Experiment 1 by making it intemet-
based, thus making it easier to administer to more people. Moreover, Boroditsky and 
Ramscar (2002) found that spatial experience influences people's thinking about time. 
Thus by administering the questionnaire in the classroom, as we did in Experiment 1, 
participants were subject to similar spatial experiences which may have impacted how 
they answered the questionnaire. By having the questionnaire available on the internet, 
we increased our chances that participants are answering the survey in different spatial 
contexts. 
Methods. 
Participants. Two-hundred thirty-four University of Richmond undergraduates. 
Participants were randomly selected from the campus email directory and contacted by 
email. 
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Procedure. Participants were sent an email in which they were told that they had 
been chosen to participate in a web-based survey. The survey looked similar to the paper-
based questionnaire with the exception of a few changes. First, instead of being asked to 
think of an event about which they feel dread or enthusiasm, they were asked to think of 
an event about which they might feel negatively or positively. Second, after having 
thought about their event, participants were asked a series of questions meant to serve as 
a mood manipulation check. Finally, participant email addresses were entered into a 
lottery of $50. 
Results. As in Experiment 1, chi-square tests were conducted to assess the 
influence of emotion on one's construal of time. The first chi-square test, examining the 
effect of emotion on participant's answer to the day question was not significant, _2 (1, 
229) = 1.53,p = .22. Results for the approach question however were significant, _2 (1, 
233) = 18.9,p < .001. Significance was also found for the question concerning how the 
participant felt now that the event had been moved forward two days, _2 (1, 227) = 50.35, 
p < .001. The observed frequencies for all three questions can be found in Tables 2A-2C. 
Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2 
In these first two experiments, participants in the negative condition significantly 
reported that they felt that the event was approaching them (time-moving) while those in 
the positive condition significantly reported that they were approaching the event (ego-
moving). This significance was strong and as predicted. However, when asked to which 
day the event had been moved, results are not significant, although they are moving in the 
predicted direction. What about the approach question taps into the metaphoric 
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perspective more so than does the day question? Why would one show much stronger 
significance than the other? 
One possible explanation might be that the last two questions (that of approach 
and feeling about the changed event) ask participants to respond in a way that is mon>: 
directly associated with emotion. The first question regarding day, however, asks 
participants to provide a specific temporal answer with no reference to affective reaction. 
Moreover, people tend to have a fixed idea about which answer is the correct one to this 
question (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), thus the manipulation of emotion may not have 
been powerful enough to activate spatial thinking with regards to day. 
Alternatively, perhaps there is a natural bias toward the time-moving perspective 
given an ambiguous temporal sentence. McGlone and Harding (1998) found this to be the 
case. Specifically they found that participants generally prefer time-moving consistent 
interpretations. They reason that this might be due to a higher prevalence of time-moving 
sentences in text and discourse in general. The question about day represents one such 
ambiguous temporal sentence and thus perhaps participants in both positive and negative 
conditions are answering "Monday" more often due to a time-moving bias. The approach 
question, on the other hand, lacks ambiguity and perhaps taps more strongly into the 
approach/avoidance drive that is present. 
Moreover, Gray (2001) suggests that spatial tasks are enhanced by withdrawal 
states and impaired by approach states while the opposite holds true for verbal 
performance, suggesting that approach-withdrawal states have selective influences on 
cognitive control. Perhaps such a spatial bias for withdrawal states subtly influenced our 
manipulation such that those in the negative condition were more apt to apply 
Time and Emotion 14 
spatiotemporal metaphors to their thinking relative to those in the positive condition. 
Further explanations will be discussed in our General Discussion. 
Despite the non-significance of the day question, the results from these two 
experiments support the idea that emotion activates spatiotemporal thinking on a certain 
level. In order to further understand this process, the directionality of this effect should be 
explored. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 examined whether this effect is bi-directional. If emotion activates 
spatiotemporal metaphoric perspectives, might spatiotemporal metaphors activate 
emotion? In particular, how might the ego-moving perspective or the time-moving 
perspective make one feel about a neutral event? 
Methods. 
Participants. Sixty-one participants were recruited at both the University of 
Richmond Arts & Sciences Research Symposium and at the campus coffee shop, "8:15 at 
Boatwright", in University of Richmond's Boatwright Library. 
Procedure. The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether spatial 
language used to describe time might influence people's feelings about an event. 
Participants were givefl a brief two-sentence excerpt in which a character named Paul 
discussed an event scheduled for Wednesday that had been moved forward two days. In 
one condition, Paul used the ego-moving metaphor to describe the scheduled event and 
said it had been moved to Friday. In the second condition, Paul used the time-moving 
metaphor to describe the event and said it had been moved to Monday. (See Appendix A 
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for scenarios). After reading the excerpt, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 
(very negative) to 6 (very positive) how they think Paul felt about the event. 
Results. An independent samples T-Test was conducted to compare how people 
felt in the ego-moving condition to how those participants felt in the time-moving 
condition. Results are significant, t(59) = -2.2,p < .05, such that participants in the time-
moving condition rated that Paul felt more negatively (M= 3.0, SE= .17) about the event 
than did those in the ego-moving condition (M = 3.6, SE= .22). (See Table 3 and Figure 
1.) 
DISCUSSION 
Based on these results, it appears that spatiotemporal metaphors play a role in 
activating emotion. Specifically, ego-moving language activates positivity while time-
moving language activates negativity. These results suggest that this is a bi-directional 
process such that emotion (positivity and negativity) activates and is activated by spatial 
metaphors. These findings support the intimate relationship between language and 
thought in that spatiotemporal language had an impact on participant's affective 
reactions. 
Within each condition of this study, the day was consistent with the 
spatiotemporal metaphor. Specifically, in the ego-moving condition, the day was moved 
forward to Friday while in the time-moving condition, the day was moved forward to 
Monday. Follow-up experiments will investigate how this effect holds when the day is 
inconsistent with its respective metaphoric time perspective. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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In summary, findings reported from these three experiments offer evidence that 
emotion influences and is influenced by spatial thinking and conceptual metaphor. In 
particular, we found that positivity facilitates proactive spatial thinking while negativity 
is associated with a more passive representation of spatial thinking. With respect to time, 
given a neutral scenario, described in ego-moving or time-moving language, people are 
more likely to feel respectively positive or negative about that neutral scenario. 
Based on results from the first two experiments, positive or negative feelings 
about an event will influence how people spatially perceive themselves with respect to 
this event. Specifically, participants in the negative condition see themselves as passive 
while those in the positive condition perceive themselves to be more proactive. 
This is consistent with research looking at motivational systems of behavior in 
particular those driven by approach and avoidance goals (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Dickson 
& MacLeod, 2004). This research suggests that positivity is associated with proactive, 
approach behavior while negativity is associated with avoidance behavior (relative to 
approach behavior) as evidenced by diminished approach motivation and more passive 
behavior. Clinical and cognitive research (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004) shows that 
depression, for example, is associated with a motivational hopelessness and 
disengagement. As a result, this negative affect produces a more passive way of thinking 
about oneself. This active-passive dichotomy of motivational thinking and behavior 
seems to be present in the approach data found in this study. 
With respect to spatiotemporal metaphors, while it is possible that this activity 
and passivity underlies respective ego-moving and time-moving perspectives, because we 
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did not get significant results on the day question, at this stage such a conclusion cannot 
be determined. 
Taking into account what we know about the influence of conceptual metaphor 
as well as the influence of emotion on approach and avoidance thoughts and behaviors, 
these results make sense. It is unclear, however, why this bi-directional phenomenon did 
not show up in the question regarding change of day. At this stage, we can only 
hypothesize as to why this might be the case. 
One possibility might be that emotion does not have a strong enough effect on 
how people construe time to the extent that they will unwittingly change how they would 
answer the day question. Perhaps, as discussed above, affect is shaping proactive and 
passive spatial thinking, but not necessarily perception of time. Given the research 
showing the strong relationship between spatiotemporal metaphors and thought 
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; McGlone & Harding, 1998) coupled with that finding 
evidence for the role of emotion in approach/avoidance behavior (Cacioppo et al. 1993; 
Chen & Bargh, 1999, Friedman & Forster, 2000), it seems premature to discount the idea 
that emotion would not affect people's thinking about time. 
An alternative explanation might be that people might want positive events to 
happen sooner (hence wishing them to be Monday), but might also take a more proactive 
ego-moving perspective by pushing the event to Friday, as these results indicate. Such a 
conflict could explain the noise found in our data on the question about day. A possible 
approach that might help to counter this variance would be to set the event in the distant 
future in order to reduce the immediacy of the event and thus the wish factor associated 
with this positivity. 
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Moreover, the power of the manipulation should be considered. For our purposes, 
we primed participants to think positively or negatively about an upcoming event of their 
choosing, actual or made-up. By having participants imagine an event, perhaps we are 
tapping into an emotional response that is strong enough to affect how people construe 
time with respect to "approach" but not strong enough to change people's intuitions about 
the day change. Perhaps such a manipulation that makes participants feel about a future 
event is not as strong as one that would make participants feel in the present. 
Consequently, this may have affected how participants responded to the day question. 
Further research using real positive and negative events as manipulation may be 
considered. However, in using real events, we must be cautious of the possibility that 
more than one emotion may be elicited, thus confounding our manipulation. Another 
approach may be to create third-person scenarios (extremely positive and extremely 
negative) as we did in Experiment 3. While such a manipulation risks not tapping into to 
true affective reactions, the ability to control the manipulation might outweigh this cost. 
Finally, rather than directly examining how spatial experience influences people's 
thinking about time as did Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002), in the present studies we are 
looking at how emotion (an abstract concept) influences thinking about time (another 
abstract concept) via the more concrete domain of space. Thus by examining a less direct 
process, we are open to more mediating factors that might decrease the effect of the 
approach/avoidance influence of emotion. Representation of spatial experience, for 
instance, as we know plays a strong role in people's thinking about time and thus 
undoubtedly plays a factor in our studies. Future research should make an effort to 
observe participants' spatial context while they are filling out the questionnaire and 
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analyze the data accordingly. Such analysis hopefully would help to tease apart and 
clarify the role of emotion in driving people's construal of time. 
Stepping back from the examination of the role of emotion on people's construal 
of time, it is interesting to consider how these data fit in with the idea of locus of control. 
Locus of control refers to the extent to which people see their actions having direct 
consequences on outcomes. On the one hand, people might believe that outcomes are 
contingent on proactive behavior (internal locus of control). On the other hand, people 
might believe that outcomes are chance and unpredictable and thus take a rather passive 
approach (external locus of control). 
Recent research on locus of control suggests that negative affect is associated with 
external locus of control while positive affect is associated with internal locus of control 
(Klonowicz, 2001; Henson & Chang, 1998). The findings of the approach question 
reported here suggest a similar relationship. Specifically, those in the negative condition 
significantly reported that "the event is approaching me" (external locus of control) while 
those in the positive condition reported that "I am approaching the event" (a more 
internal locus of control perspective.) Language, in this case spatial metaphor, provides 
us with a tool with which we can understand individual perspectives. It would stand to 
reason that clinical research as well as treatment should further explore the means by 
which language and metaphor may be a valuable tool for understanding individual affect 
and cognition. 
As we can see, metaphor is pervasive in our language and reflects our thinking, 
our understanding and feelings about the world around us. Cross-cultural research on 
conceptual metaphor (Boroditsky, 2001; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 
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2004) has provided evidence that metaphoric thinking can be variable depending on 
culture and that language may be a powerful root source of this difference in cognition. 
Future research in this area will further benefit and elucidate our understanding of the 
mechanisms by which language plays a role in shaping human thought and cognitive 
processes. 
From a neurobiological perspective, recent research conducted by Kemmerer 
(2005) on patients with neurological damage suggests that while spatial metaphor is 
fundamental "scaffolding" for conceptualizing abstract concepts in more concrete terms, 
this language may not always activate spatial thinking. Specifically, his evidence 
supports the idea that spatial and temporal meaning, while intimately linked, may also be 
processed independently. As we advance our knowledge of the cognitive implications of 
conceptual metaphor, specifically space, such neurological work should be considered as 
a means of further understanding the underlying processes at work. 
Emotion, based on the present research, seems to be intimately linked with how 
people think about time. Yet, a host of further variables are also at work influencing 
subjective time perception. It follows that to properly understand this integrated network 
that drives our construal of time, and even cognition in general, it is important to gain a 
holistic picture of how the underlying processes of this network influence each other, as 
they do not exist in a vacuum. Our embodied knowledge and perceptions are a result of 
an accumulation of sensorimotor experiences (emotional reaction, spatial movement) that 
influence each other in shaping thought. Abstract thought, in particular, capitalizes on 
more concrete domains, such as space, and is thus subject to even more influences from 
both physical and affective experience. 
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Thus far, the majority of research studying abstract thinking about time has 
looked at concrete spatial influences on this perspective. Here we add to this body of 
research by offering evidence that emotion, as well as spatial experience, plays a 
fundamental role in our spatial conception of time. Moreover, this research sheds new 
light on the flexibility of metaphor and its unique ability to reflect our thinking and our 
feelings. Specifically, these findings highlight an important relationship between affect 
and locus of control that is observed via spatial metaphor. The implications of such uses 
of spatial metaphor would seem to be beneficial to clinical research and assessment. 
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Appendix A 
Scenario 1 
We're interested in how people make inferences given very little information. 
Please read this excerpt: 
Paul explained, "It was scheduled for a week from Wednesday. As I got closer to 
the event, I learned that it had been moved forward two days to Friday." 
How do you think Paul feels about the event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very negative Very Positive 
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Appendix A cont. 
Scenario 2 
We're interested in how people make inferences given very little information. 
Please read this excerpt: 
Paul explained, "It was scheduled for a week from Wednesday. As the event got 
closer, I learned that it had been moved forward two days to Monday." 
How do you think Paul feels about the event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very negative Very Positive 
TABLES 
Table 1A 
Observed Frequencies for Day Question 
Monday 
Friday 
Table 1B 
Positive 
43 
30 
Observed Frequencies for Approach Question 
Event Approaching 
Approaching Event 
Table 1C 
Positive 
30 
47 
Observed Frequencies for Emotion Question 
Worse 
Better 
Positive 
31 
46 
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Negative 
55 
23 
Negative 
50 
28 
Negative 
53 
25 
Table 2A 
Observed Frequencies for Day Question 
Monday 
Friday 
Table 28 
Positive 
93 
17 
Observed Frequencies for Approach Question 
Event Approaching 
Approaching Event 
Table 2C 
Positive 
46 
66 
Observed Frequencies for Emotion Question 
Worse 
Better 
Table 3 
Positive 
29 
87 
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Negative 
93 
26 
Negative 
84 
37 
Negative 
80 
31 
Mean Rating and Standard Deviation of Emotion Inferred based on 
Spatiotemporal Metaphor 
Ego-Moving 
Time-Moving 
M 
3.6 
3.0 
SE 
.21 
.17 
4.2 I 
4.0 I 
3,8 I 
~ 
lJ 
z 3.6 I 
~ Ct: 
w 3.4 I 
VI 
N 
I 3.2 I 
+ .._... 
~ 3.0 I 
~ 
2,8 I 
2.6 I 
2.4 
ij. 
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Figures 
la ll 
Time-Moving Ego-Moving 
PERSPECTIVE 
Figure 1. Average ratings with standard error of means for time-moving 
and ego-moving conditions. 
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